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Abstract
Consumers make mistakes when facing complex purchasing decision problems but if at least
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Behavioral economics finds that consumers have “inconsistent, context dependent preferences”
and may not have “enough brainpower to evaluate and compare complicated products” (Spiegler,
2011). They “may fail to choose in accordance with what, after sufficient reflection, they would ac-
knowledge to be their own best interests” (Gaudeul and Sugden, 2011). Low levels of consumer lit-
eracy and numeracy even in advanced economies make it very difficult for broad swathes of the
population to understand how to make adequate decisions in many situations, such as when choos-
ing how much to save for retirement, when selecting healthcare insurance, when investing in stock
markets, when comparing car or computer models, etc. (Agarwal and Mazumder, 2010; Ayal, 2011;
Bar-Gill and Stone, 2009; Lusardi, 2008; Miravete, 2003; Wilson and Price, 2010).
Marketing research (Morwitz et al., 1998; Nunes, 2000; Viswanathan et al., 2005; Zeithaml, 1982)
and research from behavioral economics (Ariely, 2008; Iyengar and Lepper, 2000; Iyengar et al., 2004)
gives examples of how badly consumers deal with products choices in realistic purchasing scenarios.
Experiments on this topic include Huck and Wallace (2010), Choi et al. (2010) and Shestakova (2011)
among others.
The consumers biases, limitations and inconsistencies that are evidenced in such research have
consequences in terms of strategy for firms (Ellison, 2006; Spiegler, 2011). Firms may benefit from
introducing spurious complexity in their contract offerings so as to deliberately obfuscate consumer
choice (Carlin, 2009; Chioveanu and Zhou, 2009; Ellison, 2005; Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Piccione
and Spiegler, 2010). To use a term introduced by Adams (1997), sectors in which firms do so are
“confusopolies”. This is defined as “a group of companies with similar products who intentionally
confuse consumers instead of competing on price”. Sectors in which this might be the case include
telephone services, insurance, mortgage loans, banking, financial services, electricity, etc. In all those
sectors, firms sell a relatively homogeneous product and so would make low profits if they did not
introduce spurious differentiation in their offerings and thus undermine consumers’ ability to make
informed choices about their services and products. Recent research does find empirical evidence
that firms might design their offers to exploit consumers (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006; Ellison
and Ellison, 2009; Miravete, 2003, 2011). Kalaycı and Potters (2011) also found experimental evidence
that more complex offers increase firms profits in a duopoly setting
Faced with such issues, libertarian paternalists (Camerer et al., 2003; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008)
suggest regulatory intervention to impose that consumers’ decision problems be framed in such a
way that they reach the “correct” decision, that is, the decision they would take absent their limita-
tions. However, determining what decision that would be is difficult, not to mention that even experts
may not know what is best (Freedman, 2010). A complementary option is to introduce measures to
educate consumers and provide them with information so they have the tools to make better choices
in a wide variety of settings (Agarwal et al., 2010; Garrod et al., 2008).
Before even considering such interventions, one has to prove they are needed, and Sugden (2004)
argues that they are not. He maintains that consumers ought to be left free to choose as they wish and
the market left free to fulfill their needs as they occur. Sustaining this argument, Gaudeul and Sugden
(2011) show that competition will drive firms to simplify their offerings on their own if at least some
consumers discard offers that are difficult to compare with others. This is what they call the common
standard effect. The common standard rule (choose only among offers that are easy to compare
with others) is a rule of thumb that assists consumers in their selection of which product to buy. An
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example of how it operates goes as follows: a consumer wants to buy a fruit and is faced with the
choice between two oranges and one apple. Oranges are priced at $0.45 and $0.55 respectively, while
the price of the apple is $0.70. Suppose the consumer cares only about calories and estimates the
oranges to contain 35 calories each while he thinks the the apple contains 55 calories. The consumer
discards the higher priced orange from his consideration set and compares the lower priced orange
with the apple in terms of price per calories. From the price and calorific content of each fruit, he
calculates that the lower priced orange costs $1.29 per 100 calories, while the apple costs $1.27 per
100 calories. The lower priced orange appears to cost more than the apple, but the consumer still
chooses it under the CS rule. We will see this makes sense as long as the consumer is not sure about
how different fruits compare in terms of calorific content (he knows he might have made mistakes
in his evaluation), there is little intrinsic differences between products (he cares only about calories),
and the consumer does not hold prior beliefs on the value of each product (he does not believes
for example that apples are always the best deal). This rule derives strength from its simplicity, has
strong behavioral foundations and can be applied in many settings, thus ensuring its evolutionary
robustness. Contributing to the later, we will see that there is no need for others to follow it for it to
be optimal.
To clarify our meanings, what we call a “standard” here is what others have called a “frame”, that
is, to paraphrase Spiegler (2011, p.151), an aspect of a product’s presentation that is of no relevance to
a consumer’s utility and yet affects his ability to make comparisons among alternatives. This can be
a price format, the language in a contract clause, but also a unit of measurement, a way of packaging
a product, a technical standard, etc. . . Expressing an offer in terms of a common standard does not
inherently make that offer less complex to understand. That is, a CS offer when standing on its own
will not be easier to evaluate than an offer that is presented in terms of an individuated standard
(“IS”). It is only when put in relation with other offers that a CS offer will be easier to evaluate than an
IS offer. To take an example, the switch by Apple from PowerPC processors to Intel x86 processors in
2006 did not make the performance of Apple computers easier to evaluate, but it did make it easier
to compare with the performance of most other computers. Our argument is thus not an argument
about complexity, but about comparability.
This paper contributes to the experimental literature on consumer decisions in complex settings
by exploring whether consumers make use of common standard information, and if so, how much
and in which way. We identify what choice heuristics consumers follow when they face menus of of-
fers that are individually difficult to evaluate but can be compared with others. We focus in particular
on whether consumers favor offers that are easier to compare.
Subjects are asked in our experiment to buy paint to cover a given fixed area, known and the same
for all. They are presented with menus of offers, whereby an offer is presented in terms of the price
of the offer and the area the offer can cover for that price. The areas are presented in different shapes
(circles, triangles and squares) of different sizes, all smaller than the total fixed area to be covered. It
is therefore not only difficult for our subjects to assess how much each offer would cost to cover the
given fixed area, but also difficult to determine which of the offers in a menu is the least expensive.
However, offers that are of the same shape and size (of the same “standard”) are easy to compare, the
lower priced of the two being unambiguously a better deal.
We find that our subjects generally obtain better payoffs when a menu includes some offers that
3
are expressed in terms of a common standard, that is, when some offers within a menu are easy
to compare. We also observe that a number of consumers favor the lower priced of the CS offers
(“LPCS”). While only a minority of consumers follow this “common standard rule”, the intensity of
their preference for the LPCS ensures that products expressed in terms of a common standard gen-
erate higher revenues than others.
We chose to rely on a controlled laboratory setting because empirical data is not well suited for
our purpose. Relying on product sales, for example, introduces various confounds: the presence of
real along with spurious product differentiation; regulations that impose standards for a variety of
reasons; economies of scale and network effects that encourage the convergence to a technological
standard; reputation concerns that lead firms not to wish to confuse consumers; framing other than
the standard adopted by the offer that may influence choice as well; habits such that the consumer
chooses a product based on past purchasing behavior, and so on. Doing an experiment in the labo-
ratory allows us to create genuine spurious complexity, that is, complexity that all consumers would
agree should be irrelevant to their choice. We kept the laboratory experience close to a purchasing
act by framing the experiment as a real buying decision in which the participants were asked to buy a
product out of menus of offers with the aim of minimizing expenditure. This means that even though
the task was cognitively complex and making correct choices was difficult, our subjects were still able
to easily understand the task they were asked to perform.
1 Experimental design
Our subjects were first faced with a purchasing tasks, which constitutes the core of our experiment,
and then had to complete a set of control tasks and fill out a questionnaire. The next section describes
the main task.
1.1 Themain task
In order to explore consumer behavior when faced with a problem that is both simple to understand
but complex to solve, we designed a novel purchasing task with a simple structure in which com-
plexity was introduced in a natural way. Subjects were given a budget B to buy gray paint in order to
cover a fixed, square area A. They were presented with menus consisting of a number of offers, each
offer being expressed in terms of its price and a visual representation of the area that the paint could
cover for that price. Formally, each offer was a triple (s, a, p) in which s is a shape, a is the area of the
shape s, expressed as a fraction of the total area A, and p is the price of the offer. Participants were
told that paint quality did not differ across offers. The subjects’ payoff was what remained from their
budget B once all the paint needed to cover A had been bought at the cost implied by the chosen
offer. The overall price paid for the chosen offer was calculated as p/a, and the payoff for the subject
was B −p/a.
While the task is conceptually very simple and relates to everyday activities - subjects must min-
imize expenditure when buying a product of standardized quality - it is also cognitively quite hard,
as evaluating hidden unit prices and comparing areas of different shapes can be difficult. Presenting
offers in terms of a combination of a shape and a size allowed us to introduce a relatively high level
of spurious complexity in an intuitive way while drawing on an existing body of research on shape
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perceptions (Krider et al., 2001). The concept of a standard was also easily introduced within our de-
sign: two offers within a menu that shared the same shape and size were easy to compare in terms of
price, as price was then the only remaining differentiating factor. We therefore denote in our setting
an offer as being a common standard offer if it has an equivalent in terms of size and shape in the
menu.
Since the basic task (choosing an offer within a menu) was repeated several times, we wanted
to exclude by design the possibility for our subjects to learn some specific pattern in the offers. Our
offers could thus take three different shapes, each of twelve possible sizes, meaning that there were 36
possible distinct standards. Prices themselves were randomly generated, meaning that it was almost
impossible for consumers to rely on past purchasing experiences within our experiment to inform
their present purchasing task.
The offers’ three dimensions varied in the following way:
1. The shape s could be a circle, a square, or an equilateral triangle. We considered only those
three shapes so as to be able to build on the existing literature on shape comparisons (Krider
et al., 2001).
2. The area a took one of 12 possible values. Normalizing A to 100, these values ranged from 10
to 43, in steps of 3.1 The step was chosen to be big enough to allow our subjects to determine
easily whether an offer was bigger than another of the same shape within a menu, while being
small enough to yield a sufficient number of steps and therefore a sufficient number of different
(s, a) pairs in order to minimize learning from comparisons across menus.
3. The price information conveyed to the subjects, p, was computed from randomly drawn unit
prices (up, the cost to cover 1% of A) as p = up · a. Unit prices were drawn from a normal
distribution of mean 0.5, while standard deviationσ2 was equal to either 0.05, which generated
more distance between offers and hence an easier problem, or 0.01, which generated closer
offers and thus made it harder to identify the best one.
The offers were displayed as a gray area centered on a white background representing the total area
to be painted. The triangular offers rested on their base while square offers rested on a side. The
white background allowed participants to visually appreciate the size of the shape with respect the
total area to be painted. This background was overlaid with a grid of thin light blue lines to ease
comparison between offers of the same shape. This made it possible for participant to assess if two
offers of the same shape were indeed of the same size.
The offers were displayed in menus, that varied in length (3 or 6 offers per menu). Menus were
randomly generated under the constraint that no offer was to give a negative payoff to the participant.
With respect to CS, menus could feature no common standard, such that a given (s, a) combination
would appear only once within the menu; one common standard, such that two (and only two) of-
fers featured the same (s, a) combination; or two common standards (only possible for menus of six
offers), whereby one (s, a) combination occurred twice while another occurred thrice.
An example of a menu with three elements and a common standard (the triangle) is shown in
figure 1. An example of a menu with six elements and no common standard is shown in figure 2.
1The size was limited to 43 as an equilateral triangle resting on a base cannot cover more than (5×
p
75)/100= 43.3% of a
10×10 square.
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Figure 1: Screen shot of a menu with three offers and a common standard
Figure 2: Screen shot of a menu with six offers and no common standard
Each individual was faced with 80 menus, the same set for everyone but presented in a subject-
specific random order. 36 menus showed three options (“3-menus”), of which 18 with one CS. 44
showed six options (“6-menus”), of which 18 with one CS and 8 with two CS (one CS with two mem-
bers, the other CS with three). In each case, half of the menus were hard (σ2 = 0.01) while the other
half were easy (σ2 = 0.05). The distribution of menus is summarized in table 1 .2
Table 1: Distribution of menus by CS and difficulty of the problem
Hard menus Easy menus
(σ2 = 0.01) (σ2 = 0.05)
3-menu
No CS 9 9
One CS 9 9
6-menu
No CS 9 9
One CS 9 9
Two CS 4 4
Given the random process governing unit price generation, the lowest priced common standard
offer had a theoretical chance of being the optimal choice in 23 of our 3-menus with a CS, in
1
3 of our
2The menus are available for visual inspection at https://people.econ.mpg.de/∼crosetto/Shapes/Menus.html.
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6-menus with one CS, and in 56 of our 6-menus with two CS. The actual realization of these chances
was 0.55 in 3-menus, 13 in 6-menus with one CS and 0.875 in 6-menus with 2 CS.
The participants had up to two minutes to choose an offer from each menu and were forced
to spend a minimum time of 10 seconds on each menu. The choice was performed by clicking on
an offer - in which case it would be highlighted with a light green frame - and could be revised as
many times as one wanted within the two minutes limit. The choice was finalized by clicking on a
’Submit’ button at the bottom of the screen. If no final choice was submitted within the time limit
the last highlighted offer was submitted as the final choice; if no offer had been highlighted, then the
participant received a payment of 3 euros for that trial, which was less than the minimum payment
a participant could get even if he made the worst choice out of all our menus.3
The participants were given feedback after each menu. This feedback reminded them of the price
of their chosen offer, told them the resulting expenditure to paint A, as well as their payoff in terms
of budget minus expenditure. The participants were not given the possibility to automatically store
and retrieve their payoffs from previous rounds, but were provided with pencil and paper and some
did record their payoffs. After the feedback dialog, they were given a new budget B and shown the
next menu. The participants knew the total number of menus was 80 and were reminded of their
progress along the experiment.
1.2 Control tasks
Once finished with the main task, the participants were exposed to a set of non-incentivized visual
perception and computational skills tasks to control for their ability to perform the main task. No
minimum time was enforced and the participants could skip any question within each task.4 Three
different set of tasks were chosen:
1. Shape size comparisons: The participants were asked to give their estimate of the relative size
of a shape (rectangles, circles and triangles) with respect to another. Each of four comparison
had to be done within a time limit of one minute.
2. Mathematical operations. The participants were asked to solve three sets of 10 operations
(sum, subtraction, multiplication, divisions).5 Each set had to be completed within one minute.
3. Simple problems: The participants were asked to solve four simple problems, testing their un-
derstanding of the concept of area, of how an area relates to its dimensions, and how a number
can be translated from one standard to another (here, a currency). Each problem had to be
solved within two minutes.
Once done with the control tasks, the participants filled in a short demographic questionnaire. They
were finally asked to guess what the experiment was about - to check for demand effects - and to rate
their level of motivation during the experiment. Finally, each participant individually drew a number
3Only one participant failed to submit a decision within the time limit, and this only once, in that case highlighting no
offer.
4Only one participant did so.
5The sets were generated using Mail Goggles’s GMail Labs app by Jon Perlow and were graded in terms of difficulty. See
http://gmailblog.blogspot.com/2008/10/new-in-labs-stop-sending-mail-you-later.html
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from 1 to 80 from an urn and was paid according to the result of her purchasing decision in the period
corresponding to that number.
Our whole experiment was computerized. The experimental software, the menu generator and
the script we used to collect and organize the raw data were programmed in Python (van Rossum,
1995).6 The German instructions, as well as their English translation, are available upon request.
2 How can (or should) consumersmake choices
There are many ways in which one may model consumer choice among offers in our menus, but we
will limit ourselves to combinations of two simple criteria for choosing between products: based on
imperfect observation of unit prices (what we will call “signals”), and based on whether the product
belongs to a CS or not. Other choice factors will be evoked in part 2.4.
Denote ˆupi j = upi +ei j the perceived unit price of offer i by consumer j . upi is the unit price of
offer i , while ei j is an error term, which is independent across offers in a menu and across consumers.
How large the error term will be on average will depend on the consumer’s accuracy and on how
difficult it is to compare offers across standards. As for whether an offer belongs to a CS or not, this
matters because prices are directly comparable within a standard, so the consumer can identify the
LPCS with high accuracy.7 From those two criteria, we can derive four possible heuristics, illustrated
in the following graph and explained below.
First
Second
Common
Standard
Signals CommonStandardNo Signals
No Common
Standard
DE
Dominance Editing
LPCS
Lowest Priced
Common Standard
SF
Signals First NaiveRule
Signals
Threshold
Figure 3: Choice criteria and heuristics
On the left, if the consumer first considers whether offers belong to a CS, he will then eliminate
all higher priced CS offers (“HPCS”). From this point on, he may end his search by choosing the LPCS
(this is the CS rule), or he may compare the signal of the LPCS with that of the individuated standard
offers (“IS”) in the menu and choose the offer with the lowest signal, which is what we call Dominance
6Different python modules were needed to develop the experimental software: wxpython was used for the graphical
user interface, and two community-contributed packages, svgfig and polygon, were used for creating and managing the
shapes. The experimental software (menu and shape generators and analyzers, user interface) and its documentation, as
well as the raw data and the script used to collect and organize them are available upon request.
7We will consider the possibility that a consumer may make mistakes in choosing among CS even if he is aware of their
existence, though one may alternatively argue that choosing a higher priced CS offer means the consumer does not take
account of CS information.
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Editing (“DE”). On the right, if the consumer first considers signals, he may provisionally choose the
offer with the lowest signal. If he does not take account of the existence of a common standard, then
he will opt for that offer, thus following what we call the Naive rule (“Na” rule). If on the other hand
the consumer takes account of the existence of a CS and the offer he provisionally chose turns out to
belong to a CS, he will check whether his provisional choice is the LPCS, and if not, revise his choice
and opt for the LPCS. This is what we call the Signal-First rule (“SF” rule).
In other terms, the Naive rule chooses argmin
i
uˆp i j , the CS rule chooses argmin
i∈C S
pi (the LPCS) if
a CS exists and reverts to the Naive rule otherwise, the DE rule determines k = argmin
i∈C S
pi if there is a
CS, in which case it chooses argmin
i∉C S
(uˆpk j , uˆp i j ) and reverts to the Naive rule otherwise, the SF rule
determines l = argmin
i
uˆp i j and then chooses argmin
i∈C S
pi if l ∈CS, otherwise chooses l .
2.1 The CS rule
We concentrate in this paper on the CS rule, which is such that consumers not only avoid the higher
priced of the common standard offers but choose the lower priced of the CS offers (the “LPCS”) and
disregard individuated standard (“IS”) offers. There are many reasons why we would expect con-
sumers to follow such a rule:
1. Statistically, if one assumes that prices are i.i.d. across offers and offers are assigned to a CS
at random, then the LPCS is lower priced in expectation than other offers. As in the Monty-
Hall problem (Friedman, 1998), there is information gained from being told that an option is
dominated.
2. Behaviorally, consumers have been shown to be subject to the asymmetric dominance effect
(Ariely, 2008, Chapter 1), so that when faced with three offers, one being dominated by another,
that other will be chosen more often than if the dominated offer was not present. Another
way to call this effect in the field of decision theory is the “attraction effect”, which is a type of
context effect (Huber and Puto, 1983).
3. From learning: Gaudeul and Sugden (2007) argue that consumers are better off choosing among
CS offers when firms are strategic agents in a competitive setting, subject to at least some
agents following the CS rule. This learning is made easier by the applicability of the common
standard rule to many environments, so that consumers who learned from one environments
that CS offers are lower priced than other offers will apply this insight generally. Consumers
ought therefore to learn to choose CS offers over time (Sugden, 1986; Fudenberg and Levine,
1998).
4. For simplicity, as agents faced with complex choices tend to follow simple heuristics, often with
good results (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009). In this case, an offer being unambiguously better
than another provides “one good reason” to choose it (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1999).
The CS rule, based on multiple foundations, can thus be generalized across many settings and is
likely to be more robust than rules that hold only in some settings (Sugden, 1989) or that can be jus-
tified in only one way. We believe this rule is at work in a wide variety of consumer choice problems.
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Its simplicity and intuitive appeal make it particularly interesting for economists interested in con-
sumer behavior and heuristics, marketing, consumer protection and the competitive process. Note
that we are not wedded to one particular explanation for why consumers might prefer CS offers: we
are only interested in determining if they do so and if so, to what extent. Indeed, the main reason we
are interested in this possible consumer bias is that we believe that it could drive firms into making
their offers less difficult to compare and thus encourage the efficient working of competitive markets.
Our setting provides a lower bound for the CS effect, in so far as any competitive effect justifying the
use of the rule is excluded by design since offers are not determined through a competitive process.
2.2 The Threshold rule
We will see later that the CS rule is not amenable to econometric analysis as its predictions are too
sharp. This is why we will consider the more general Threshold rule, of which the DE and LPCS rule
are extreme cases. The Threshold rule function as follows: choose k = arg min
i∈C S
pi if there is a CS and
then choose l (v j ) = arg min
i∉C S
(uˆpk , uˆp i v j ), with threshold v j depending on consumer j ’s preference
for (v j > 1) or against (v j < 1) the LPCS. The optimal choice of threshold v j is v∗j = argmin
v j
E(upl (v j )).
Its level depends on the consumer’s accuracy in assessing the unit price of offers in a menu, with less
accurate consumers benefiting from adopting higher thresholds v j . Threshold v j = 1 corresponds to
the DE rule, while threshold v j →∞ corresponds to the CS rule.
To put this in behavioral terms, the consumer who adopts a threshold v j > 1 does not reject IS
offers out of hand, but penalizes them, that is, he does not follow his first impression (uˆp i j ) of the
value of the product, but rather revises it upwards when comparing it to his perception of the value
of common standard offers. In other terms, the consumer applies a certain dose of skepticism to his
evaluation of an offer that is expressed in uncommon terms, and will choose to buy it only if it seems
sufficiently better than the best of those offers that are expressed in common terms – that is, its unit
price appears to be lower by a factor of at least 1−1/v j compared to the apparent unit price of the
LPCS.
To make this clearer, let us come back to the example on page 3. We saw that under the CS rule,
the consumer would always choose the orange. Under the threshold rule, the consumer will choose
the orange only if his threshold v is more than 1.29/1.27= 1.016. Section 2.3 on the next page shows
that a consumer’s threshold ought to depend on his accuracy in assessing offers, with less accurate
consumer being better off adopting higher thresholds.
Note that following the CS rule is strictly optimal in the context of Gaudeul and Sugden (2011)
as IS offers are systematically higher priced than CS offers in a competitive setting where firms can
choose their standard, so that even an IS offer with a very good signal should be rejected. However,
the CS rule is not optimal in the context of our experiment as offers are randomly generated rather
than the result of a competitive process. It is therefore always better for a consumer to follow the
Threshold rule with threshold v j > 1 but not infinite as in the CS rule.
We will see later on that no consumer followed the CS rule in our experiment, but a number of
them did follow the Threshold rule. The next section goes further into comparing the performance
of the various rules introduced above.
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2.3 How do the different rules perform?
How the different rules perform depends on how accurate consumers are in their choices. There are
two extreme cases: If consumers make no mistakes, then the Naive rule works best and the CS rule is
the worst. Indeed, consider for example a 3-menus. Denote B the consumer’s budget and a,b,c i.i.d.
random variables. The perfectly accurate Naive consumer’s expected payoff is B −E(min(a,b,c)),
which is more than B −E(min(a,b)), his expected payoff if he restricted himself to CS offers. On the
other hand, a consumer who makes considerable mistakes obtains B−E(a) in expectation under the
Naive rule (he chooses essentially at random), which is less than B−E(min(a,b)), his expected payoff
under the CS rule.
We performed simulations with Octave (Eaton, 2002) to examine the performance of each rule in
terms of expected consumer payoff.8 We modeled ei j as following a normal distribution with mean
zero and varianceσ2. In the same way as in our experiment, products unit prices upi followed a nor-
mal distribution with mean 0.5 and variance 0.01 (hard menus), and 0.05 (easy menus) and B was set
to 60. Consumer choice was simulated according to the various rules expressed above (Naive, DE, CS,
SF), as well as according to the Threshold rule (“Th”), with the optimal threshold v calculated for ev-
ery level of σ2 since less accurate consumers benefit from adopting higher thresholds. Their average
payoff for each rule was calculated over 2 million menu draws so as to achieve good accuracy.9
The following graphs show payoffs in the four situations in our experimental setting, that is de-
pending on whether the consumer has a choice among three or six options, and whether menus are
easy or hard. Also shown on separate scale is the optimal threshold v∗ for each value of the error
term.
8Program available upon request.
9The ranking of payoffs by rules is quite robust as differences in payoffs are significant even for much smaller draws.
11
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
1
1.
2
1.
4
1.
6
1.
8
2
v
0 .05 .1 .15 .2
error
Easy 3−menus
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
1
1.
2
1.
4
1.
6
1.
8
2
v
0 .05 .1 .15 .2
error
Easy 6−menus
10
11
1
1.
2
1.
4
1.
6
1.
8
2
v
0 .05 .1 .15 .2
error
Hard 3−menus
10
11
1
1.
2
1.
4
1.
6
1.
8
2
v
0 .05 .1 .15 .2
error
v
Th
Na
DE
SF
CS
Hard 6−menus
Figure 4: Consumer payoffs by choice rules and optimal thresholds, by menu length and difficulty
As can be seen in figure 4, payoff decreases as consumers become less accurate in their choice
(higher levels in σ2), except for the CS rule since consumers always choose correctly among CS of-
fers and thus obtain B −E(min(a,b)). The Threshold rule outperforms all other rules, and converges
towards the CS rule for less accurate consumers. Following the CS rule obtains higher payoffs than
the DE, SF or Naive rules as long as consumers are not too accurate. The CS rule is better than those
other rules even for rather precise consumers and especially when menus are hard, as even high lev-
els of accuracy may result in mistakes if prices are close together. In terms of ranking, the Threshold
rule outperforms the CS rule, while both SF and DE dominate the Naive rule, which is because they
take account of the existence of a CS. The reason SF dominates DE is that DE does not recognize that
the LPCS is statistically of higher expected value than IS offers, while the SF does not have such a bias
against CS offers, treating them in the same way as IS offers in its first step. However, from a practical
point of view, DE saves time and effort compared to SF because it requires estimating the value of a
lower number of alternatives.
2.4 Other possible rules
Consumers may follow other rules than the ones studied above, and we controlled for those as well.
We label those alternative possible rules as follows:
• The budget rule chooses arg min pi . This is a rule that favors small packages, or equivalently
lower priced items. While this does not make sense in our setting, this rule may be imported
from other settings where for example the consumer faces a binding budget constraints Viswanathan
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et al. (2005). Alternatively, a bulk purchasing rule would favor big packages, as offers in big
packages are usually better deals than those in small packages.
• The lexicographic rule may favor the first offers in the lexicographic order in the menu – maybe
because the consumer is satisficing rather than optimizing (Simon, 1955) or simply because
he does not have time to consider all offers. Alternatively, a consumer may also favor the last
offers in the menu if he tends to remember (and choose) the last option he read from a list.
• The shape rule may favor some shapes over others, as evidenced in Krider et al. (2001).
3 Descriptive statistics and exploratory data analysis
Our experiment took place at the laboratory of the Max Planck Institute in Jena in June 2011. The
experiment involved 202 students over 8 sessions, each with 24 to 27 subjects. Our subjects were
asked for their age, gender, field of study, year of study, motivation in completing the tasks, and also
what they thought the experiment was about (in order to control for demand effects). All subjects
were students. When asked what they thought the experiment was about after going through it, most
subjects guessed we wanted to assess their abilities to take account of both price and area to identify
the best offer in our menus. Some wondered if we wanted to identify what shapes were perceived
as more attractive, but no subject mentioned that some offers were expressed in terms of a common
standard.
Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Median Std Dev. Skewness Min Max N
Age 23.65 23.00 3.69 2.31 18.00 47.00 202
Gender 0.65 1.00 0.48 -0.64 0.00 1.00 202
Score in shape comparisons 0.25 0.25 0.10 0.35 0.05 0.58 201
Score in simple problems 2.78 3.00 0.96 -0.27 1.00 4.00 202
Score in mathematical tasks 20.92 21.50 2.93 -1.45 6.00 25.00 202
Reported motivation 6.29 7.00 2.28 -0.67 0.00 10.00 202
Payoff 11.44 11.48 0.41 -0.80 9.88 12.28 202
Time spent per menu 19.67 18.34 6.36 1.30 11.66 46.27 202
The average age of our subjects was 24, ranging from 18 to 47 (Table 2). 65% of our subjects were
women. The average motivation of our subjects, on a scale from 0 to 10, was 6, with a median moti-
vation of 7 and 75% of our subjects having motivation more than 5, the middle point. The monotony
of the tasks did not therefore result in noticeable discontent. Speed of choice for each menu and each
subject was also recorded. Subjects took 20 seconds on average to make each choice (they could not
make a choice before 10 seconds had elapsed). Time spent on each menu was longer for menus with
more options and declined over time (from an average of 36 seconds for the first choice to 16 for the
last).
There were three control tasks. In the shape comparison task, subjects were asked to assess the
area of one shape in terms of multiples of another. We computed individual performance as the
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average of |guess− true value|/true value. On average, people were 25% off the true value, with a
minimum of 5% and a maximum of 58%. In the mathematical tasks, we coded answers as either
right or wrong. On average, subjects got 21 of the 25 calculations right, with only two obtaining less
than half of the calculations right, and 7 of them obtaining all of them right. Finally, in the simple
problems, only about 62% answered more than half of the questions correctly. Performance in the
different control tasks were significantly and positively correlated, though not highly (correlation
coefficients were around 0.35). Women performed less well than men in all control tasks.
Individual choices, payoffs andperformance Overall, consumers made about 39% of their choices
correctly, that is, choosing the offer with the lowest unit price. In only 21 of the 80 menus did a
majority of the consumers make the correct choice. In other terms, most consumers were wrong for
most menus.10 Table 3 shows that the LPCS was chosen about 57% of the time within our 3-menus,11
about as often as the LPCS was the lower priced product (56%). This was less often than if consumers
followed the CS rule, whereby the LPCS would always be chosen. However, the IS was disfavored as
it was chosen less often than if consumers always chose the lowest priced product (37% of the time
vs. 44% if choice were optimal). In the case of 6-menus with one CS, the LPCS was chosen about
26% of the time in 6-menus with only one CS, which was less often than optimal (39%). The IS on
the other hand was chosen slightly more often than optimal (18% vs. 17%). Finally, the lower priced
of the larger CS (the one with three members) was chosen more often than the lower priced of the
smaller CS in 6-menus with two CS, (40% vs. 33%), but less often than optimal (62%), and the IS was
chosen more often than optimal.
In the aggregate, consumers do not follow a Naive rule since they take account of the presence of
a CS by discarding higher priced CS offers. The LPCS was chosen more often than any other offers
but there is no consistent evidence across menus length that this was due to consumers avoiding IS
offers. Rather, this is consistent with consumers following the SF rule (transferring their initial choice
of a HPCS to the LPCS), but not with following the DE rule (whereby the LPCS and the IS would be
chosen with about equal frequency).
10Looking at menus where consumers performed particularly badly, one finds that they mistakenly chose smaller size
options, triangles, options to the end of the lexicographic order, or the LPCS when the IS was actually better. This under-
lines an important point about the CS rule: while following it maximizes average payoffs for a consumer that is prone to
making mistakes, it does not lead to the correct choice for each individual choice instance.
11Differences across hard and easy menus are not significant and are therefore not reported.
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Table 3: Choice frequencies by menu length and presence of a CS
LPCS HPCS IS LPSCS HPSCS MPLCS
3-menu
No CS 33.33%
One CS 56.71% 5.86% 37.40%
6-menu
No CS 16.67%
One CS 25.55% 3.52% 17.73%
Two CS 40.41% 2.35% 17.33% 32.67% 2.97% 4.27%
Notes: In the case of 6-menus with two CS, the LPCS is the Lower Priced of the Larger CS (the one with three members), the HPCS is the
Higher Priced of the Larger CS, and the MPLCS is the Middle Priced of the Larger CS. The LPSCS is the Lower Priced of the Smaller CS
(the one with two members) and the HPSCS is the Higher Priced of the Smaller CS. In 6-menus with one CS, the IS choice frequency is
calculated by averaging across the four IS offers.
Let us now consider whether consumers benefited from the presence of a CS by looking at indi-
vidual payoffs by menu length, difficulty and presence of a CS (Table 4).
Table 4: Payoffs by menu length, difficulty and presence of a CS
Hard menus Easy menus
Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev N
3-menu
No CS 10.41 0.92 1818 11.02 4.56 1818
One CS 10.45 0.96 1818 13.34∗ 3.96 1818
6-menu
No CS 10.14 0.81 1818 11.97 4.11 1818
One CS 10.04∗ 0.98 1818 13.84∗ 5.48 1818
Two CS 10.78∗(∗) 0.87 808 12.78∗(∗) 4.34 808
* Difference significant vs. one row above.
(*) Difference significant vs. two rows above.
This table can be read in conjunction with another table that indicates how those payoffs trans-
late in terms of how close they are to the maximum available payoff in each menu. Table 5 thus
reports the average of the ratio (upmax−upchosen)/(upmax−upmin) over individuals and menus
in each category. We normalize the difference between the worst choice and the consumer’s choice
as shown because we want to be able to compare performance between easy and hard menus, where
the difference between the worst and the best choice within a menu will be smaller on average. We
call this the performance ratio. A value of 0 would indicate the consumers always made the worst
choice, while a value of 1 would indicate they always made the best choice.
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Table 5: Performance ratio by menu length, difficulty and presence of a CS
Hard menus Easy menus
Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev N
3-menu
No CS 0.597 0.447 1818 0.607 0.448 1818
One CS 0.592 0.419 1818 0.794∗ 0.324 1818
6-menu
No CS 0.683 0.353 1818 0.682 0.321 1818
One CS 0.545∗ 0.364 1818 0.735∗ 0.299 1818
Two CS 0.735∗(∗) 0.323 808 0.759(∗) 0.365 808
* Difference significant vs. one row above.
(*) Difference significant vs. two rows above.
Subjects obtained a payoff of 11.44 ECU on average (1 ECU=0.8 €), and their performance ratio
was 0.66. No participant obtained payoffs that were significantly less than 10.22, which is what they
would have obtained had they chosen at random within our menus, and only 8 obtained payoffs that
were not significantly greater than this. Subjects therefore seem to have made considered choices.
As could be expected from statistical arguments, individuals obtained higher payoffs with 6-menus
and with easy menus.
When choosing from menus with no CS, participants obtained 10.89 ECU (std. dev. 3.21) and
their performance ratio was 0.64 (std. dev. 0.40), while when choosing from menus with one CS
they obtained 11.91 ECU (std. dev. 3.84) while their performance ratio was 0.67 (std. dev. 0.37).
Participants thus generally obtained significantly higher payoffs and performed significantly better
when a menu included a CS, except in the case of hard 6-menus with one CS, where payoff was lower.
The presence of a CS did not therefore consistently improve consumer payoffs when menus were
hard, but significantly and consistently increased payoffs when menus were easy.
Panel regressions of payoffs on individual and menu characteristics (not reported) indicate that
women obtained higher payoffs and subjects with higher scores in the mathematical and practical
consumption problems obtained higher payoffs as well. Payoff increased with the order in which the
menu was presented so there was some learning. Motivation, scores in the shape comparison task
and time spent choosing an offer within each menus did not appear to have a significant effect.12
There was no individual effect, that is, no individual seemed to perform better than others above and
beyond what could be predicted from their gender and scores in control tasks. Easier menu, menus
with more choices, and the presence of a CS also increased payoffs. The effects above are robust to
various specifications.
When mapping payoffs by menu length and difficulty (rows with no CS in table 4) to the pre-
dictions from our simulations (Graph 4), we find that they correspond to a situation in which the
standard error of the consumers’ error term is 0.15 – though consumers seem more accurate when
menus were hard. A tentative explanation may be that consumers could perceive that prices in some
menus were closer together than in others, and thus paid more attention in those cases. Lower ac-
curacy when choosing from easy menus did not prevent them from obtaining higher payoffs there
12We checked also if there was some quadratic effect in terms of time spent, with time spent increasing payoffs but fastest
times (inattention) and slowest times (difficulty) obtaining lower payoffs. While coefficients were of the correct sign, they
were not significant.
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than when choosing from hard menus however. Consumers did not obtain higher payoffs in hard
6-menus than in hard 3-menus, that is, they appear to have been less accurate when faced with more
choice. Note that the optimal threshold v j if the standard error of the consumer’s error term is 0.15
would be between 1.2 and 1.4. We will see that even those consumers who followed the Threshold
rule generally chose thresholds that were lower than this, indicating perhaps that they were over-
confident in their ability to make accurate choices.
4 Econometric analysis
We first determine in this part how consumers make choices among options in menus with no CS,
then consider their choices among menus with one CS, and finally determine rules followed by con-
sumers at the individual level. This will allow us to determine whether indeed consumers prefer
offers that are presented in terms of a CS. The menus with no CS are used to simulate the outcome
of various choice rules the consumers may follow when faced with menus that include one CS (we
do not present the analysis for menus with two CS). Those predictions are then compared with the
observed choices to determine what choice rule best predicts consumer choice, at the individual and
at the global level. We therefore begin with the expression of the model to predict consumer choice
among menus with no CS.
4.1 Consumer choice when there is no common standard
We perform maximum likelihood estimation with three different models, the alternative-specific
conditional logit and probit models and the mixed logit model which allows for preference hetero-
geneity for all the attributes. The probit model is fitted by using maximum simulated likelihood im-
plemented by the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) algorithm (Greene and Hensher, 2003). The
Halton sequence is used to generate the point sets used in the quasi-Monte Carlo integration of the
multivariate normal density, while optimization is performed using the Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman
procedure (Berndt et al., 1974). The mixed logit model is fitted by using maximum simulated like-
lihood (Train, 2003) and the estimation was performed with the user-written mixlogit command
for Stata (Hole, 2007). Estimation makes use of the sandwich estimator of variance, except when
performing the probit regressions with 6-menus as convergence was not achieved otherwise.
The outcome for each menu is one of 3 or 6 options. Options are identified by their position in
the menu if there is no CS, and by whether they are the LPCS, HPCS or an IS in menus with a CS. The
dependent variable is the choice of the consumer among alternatives and the independent variables
include the unit price of the option, its shape, its size and its position. Since shapes that extend more
broadly in space are preferred (see Krider et al., 2001), we create a variable coding shapes from most
to least attractive: a triangle is assigned a value of 1, a square a value of 2 and a circle a value of 3.13
The variable “position” is coded by lexicographic position in the menu, from 1 if the option is in the
top left corner to 6 if it is in the bottom right corner in a 6-menu, otherwise to 3 for the option to
the right in a 3-menu. As per a remark in Hole (2007), we include no alternative-specific constants
in our models, which is “common practice when the data come from so-called unlabeled choice
experiments, where the alternatives have no utility beyond the characteristics attributed to them in
13We also ran the same regressions with each shape being a dummy variable. This did not influence the results.
17
the experiment.” We will also cross unit price with case specific variables such as gender and scores
in the control tasks to determine whether individual characteristics make our subjects more or less
sensitive to price signals (other individual characteristics such as age and educational background
do not vary sufficiently in our sample). We also consider a menu specific variable (whether the menu
was “hard” or “easy”) and variables that are both menu and case specific (the order in which a specific
menu was presented to an individual and the time that individual spent deciding on this menu).
Formally, denote yoi j m the utility of option j in menu m for individual i , and denote yi j m = 1 if
that option is chosen. We will have yi j m = 1 if yoi j m > yoi tm for all t 6= j in menu m, 0 else. Latent
utility yoi j m takes the form y
o
i j m =αup j m +ω×up j m ×Ωi +µ×up j m ×Mm +βshape j m +γsize j m +
φposition j m +ui j m with ui j m a random variable of mean 0 that follows either a logistic or a normal
distribution. Ωi is a q×1 vector of case-specific variables whileω is a 1×q vector of parameters. Mm
is a h×1 vector of menu-specific variables while µ is a 1×h vector of parameters.
We find that a model that takes into account all the alternative specific variables (price, position
in menu, shape, area size) minimizes the Akaike Information Criterion (“AIC”). In addition to those,
one menu specific variable was consistently significant across menu length (whether the menu was
easy or hard) and one case specific variable turned out to be significant for 3-menus (performance
in the shape comparison task). Results are shown in table 6. Subjects tend to prefer options that
have a lower unit price, “broader” shapes, and smaller sized options (equivalently, those with lower
displayed prices). There is no consistent tendency for consumers to favor either options at the be-
ginning or at the end of the menu. Subjects with low performances in the shape comparison task
were understandably less affected by unit price in their choice, and subjects were more sensitive to
unit price in hard menus.
The log-likelihood is much lower in 6-menus than in 3-menus, which means that the choices
from 6-menus are considerably less accurately predicted with our model than from 3-menus (there
was the same number of choices to make from within each menu type). This means there is more
randomness in consumer choice within 6-menus, probably because it is more difficult to compare 6
offers than 3 offers as this requires holding more information into one’s working memory.
Results from the mixed logit model indicate there is significant variation in the extent to which
an option’s shape and size influenced consumers. However, the influence of an option’s position did
not appear to vary across subjects. We can conclude that our participants have some bias that may
be explained by their use of a budget rule (choose lower priced, that is, smaller sized, options) and of
a shape rule (prefer triangles to square to circle). However, the marginal effect of an increase in unit
price is much higher than that of any other variables (not reported).
4.2 Consumer choice when there is a common standard
The analysis of the case where there is a CS differs from the case where there is no CS in that options in
a menu differ in nature depending on whether they are the LPCS, the HPCS or an IS. Whether a sub-
ject avoids the HPCS or prefers the LPCS vs. the ISs may depend on their individual characteristics so
that we introduce case-specific variables (here, a case is an individual) along with alternative-specific
variables to determine choice among alternatives. Our case specific variables are scores in the math-
ematical, shape comparison and simple problems, along with gender, time spent choosing within a
menu and motivation. We also consider whether facing a hard menu makes it more likely to favor
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the LPCS as following a simple heuristic may be more likely if there appears to be little difference in
prices between options. Finally, we consider whether the LPCS was next to the HPCS on the same
row in the menu since it is easier to notice there is a CS if CS options are close together.
The model above is thus modified as follows: Latent utility yoi j m takes the form y
o
i j m = αup j m +
ω×up j m ×Ωi +µ×up j m ×Mm +λ j ×Ωi +θ j ×Mm +βshape j m +γsize j m +φposition j m +ui j m . As
before, j is the option, m is the menu and i is the individual. An option is coded in terms of whether it
is the LPCS, the HPCS or an IS offer. Ωi is a q ×1 vector of case-specific variables, the same variables
being assumed to influence the choice for each option, ω is a 1× q vector of parameters, Mm is a
h×1 vector of menu-specific variables while µ is a 1×h vector of parameters. λ j is a 1×q vector of
parameters, different for each alternative as case-specific variables are assumed not to influence the
choice of each alternative in the same way. Similarly, θ j is a 1×h vector of parameter translating the
influence of menu characteristics on the choice of an alternative. ui j m is a random variable of mean
0 that follows either a logistic or a normal distribution. We constrain λ j and θ j to be the same for
all four IS options in 6-menus. Model selection using the AIC finds that all of the alternative specific
variables ought to be used, while only score in the shape comparison and in the mathematical tasks,
along with gender and whether a menu is hard or easy, ought to be used as case-specific variables.
Results are reported in table 7.
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In terms of alternative-specific variables, our results when there was no CS are confirmed, that
is, subjects tend to prefer lower priced options, “broader” shapes, and smaller sized options (equiv-
alently, those with lower displayed prices). One can notice that prices being close together (hard
menus) makes consumers less sensitive to price, the opposite to the result when there is no CS. This
might be due to consumers relying more on the CS rule when there is little apparent difference be-
tween offers: this rule can lead them to choosing the LPCS even when its price is actually higher than
that of the IS. This hypothesis receives some support from how consumers are more likely to avoid
the IS in 6-menus that are hard.
Case-specific variables show that consumers tend to avoid the HPCS: the parameter on the con-
stant term for that option is negative and highly significant. Individuals that are worst at the shape
comparison tasks are more likely to choose the HPCS, maybe because they find it difficult to com-
pare the area and shape of all options and thus do not notice the presence of a CS. It is however only
women who display an aversion to the IS vs. the LPCS. This aversion to the IS is encouraged when
the presence of a CS is more obvious, i.e. when the CS options are next to each other – there was
a negative impact of the dummy variable taking value one if CS options are close in 3-menus (the
impact was not consistent across logit and probit regressions in the case of 6-menus). Whether the
menu is hard also encourages individuals in rejecting the IS option, at least in 6-menus with one CS
(results in the case of 6-menus with two CS are not consistent across logit and probit regressions).
In conclusion, only women appear to follow the CS rule when choosing among options. This
might explain why women managed to obtain higher payoffs than men in this experiment even
though they were less good at control tasks that predict higher payoffs.
5 Assignment of consumers to rules
We seek in this part to compare consumers’ decisions with what would be predicted under different
selection rules, as presented in section 2.14 Consider table 8 which shows the unit price and standard
of three options in a menu, the choice of a consumer among those three options, and the predicted
choice under different choice rules. Predicted choice is expressed in terms of probabilities. The
consumer is said to follow the choice rule he is closest to in terms of log likelihood, weighted by the
number of degrees of freedom allowed by each rule.
14We do not consider the alternative selection rules exposed in section 2.4 since the biases they reflect are already cor-
rected for in our regressions via the shape, size and position variables, and the effect of those variables was relatively small.
22
Table 8: Rule predictions and consumer choice
HPCS LPCS IS
Unit price 0.51 0.50 0.48
Standard A A B
Consumer choice 0 1 0
Naive pN aHPC S p
N a
LPC S p
N a
I S
CS 0 1 0
SF 0 pN aHPC S +pN aLPC S pN aI S
DE 0 pN aLPC S(LPC S, I S) 1−pDELPC S
Threshold rule 0 pN aLPC S(LPC S, I S× v) 1−pT hLPC S
In the case shown in table 8, the consumer chooses the LPCS, and may thus be following any of
the possible rules. If he had chosen the HPCS, then one would have been able to say he must be
Naive. If he had chosen the IS, then one could have said he was not following the CS rule. If the
same type of choice is offered several times and the consumer never chooses the HPCS, then he is
unlikely to be Naive. If he always choose the LPCS, then he is likely to follow the CS rule. If he chooses
either the LPCS or the IS, but more often the LPCS, then he is likely to follow either the SF rule or a
Threshold rule.
We use the estimation results from the mixed logit regressions done for the case where there is
no CS to predict choice when there is a CS. If the consumer is Naive, his choice will be predicted
by applying parameter estimates from the model with no CS to the data with CS. If he follows the
CS rule, he will choose the LPCS. If he follows the SF rule, then the probability to choose the LPCS
is the sum of the probability to choose the HPCS or the LPCS obtained when applying parameter
estimates from the model with no CS. If he follows the DE rule, then the HPCS is excluded from the
consideration set (this is done by applying the parameter estimates from the model with no CS to the
data with a CS modified such that the price of the HPCS is unaffordable). An issue is that the CS rule
predicts the IS will never be chosen, which means that any consumer who ever chose an IS even if he
always chose the CS otherwise would be predicted not to follow the CS by the maximum likelihood
criterion. We can confirm that no consumer systematically chose the LPCS within every menus with
a CS. Therefore, strictly speaking, no consumer followed the CS rule. This is where the Threshold rule,
which spans the gap between the CS and the DE rule, comes into play.
In terms of notation, we denote the probability the LPCS is chosen under the DE rule as pDELPC S =
pN aLPC S(LPC S, I S). This is to be interpreted as the probability a Naive consumer would choose the
LPCS if his choice was restricted to either the LPCS or the IS. Similarly, the probability the LPCS is
chosen under the Threshold rule is pT hLPC S = pN aLPC S(LPC S, I S · v). This is to be interpreted as the
probability a Naive consumer would choose the LPCS if his choice was restricted to either the LPCS
or the IS and the price of the IS was multiplied by a factor v . We computed for each consumer the
threshold v j that maximizes their maximum likelihood. Subjects with a high value of v j are close to
following the CS rule, while those with low v j are close to following the DE rule.
The CS, DE and SF rules predict that the HPCS will never be chosen. However, as we saw, this
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is not the case in our data. One therefore has to take account that some consumers choose the
HPCS. We therefore do a separate regression so as to determine the probability pLPC S with which
the LPCS is chosen among CS offers. Note that in this case, only the offer’s position and its price
may determine the choice, along with some case-specific variables, since both shape and area are
the same in a CS. One then modifies the formulas above as follows: In the case of the Signal-First
rule: pSFLPC S = pLPC S(pN aHPC S + pN aLPC S) while pSFHPC S = (1− pLPC S)(pN aHPC S + pN aLPC S) and pSFI S is as be-
fore. In the case of the CS rule: pC SLPC S = pLPC S and pC SHPC S = 1− pLPC S . In the case of the DE rule:
pDELPC S = pLPC S pN aLPC S(LPC S, I S), pDEHPC S = (1−pLPC S)pN aHPC S(HPC S, I S) and pDEI S = 1−pDELPC S−pDEHPC S .
The principle is the same for obtaining pT h . Formulas are slightly longer in the case of 6-menus but
can be inferred from the above.
Compared to the Na predictions, both the SF and the DE predictions make use of an additional
degree of freedom as they require CS information. Compared to the SF and the DE, the Threshold
rule makes use of yet one more degree of freedom as it requires estimating the threshold used by the
subjects. This will be taken into account by comparing rules using the Akaike Information Criterion
(“AIC”).
In mathematical terms, the likelihood function is f (y,θ) =
N∏
t=1
M∏
j=1
p
yt j
t j with t denoting the menu,
N the total number of menus presented to consumers, j denoting the option, M the number of
options, and yt j = 1 iff yt = j , 0 otherwise, whereby yt is the consumer’s choice. pt j = Pr(yt = j ) is the
predicted probability, which depends on the rule we assume for consumers’ choice, so for example
pt j = 1 iff j is the LPCS and the consumer is assumed to follow the CS rule. y is the vector of choices
and θ are the parameters determining the choice among options.
5.1 What rule best describes aggregate behavior?
Table 9 reports the log-likelihood, the values of the AIC and of the Bayesian information criterion
(“BIC”) for each rule, for 3 and 6-menus.15 The last column contains the value of threshold v that
maximizes the log-likelihood for the Threshold rule. The number v reported there is to be interpreted
as “consumers appear to consider IS options as v times more expensive when they are presented next
to CS options than when they are presented next to other IS options”. This measures the price penalty
applied to IS options when compared to the LPCS. For more interpretation of this number, see the
detailed explanation in section 2.2.
15We only study 6 menus with one CS.
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Table 9: Rules scores, aggregate behavior
Naive Signal Dominance Threshold v
First Editing Heuristic
3-menus LL −3484 −2994 −3073 −2984 1.05
df 8 9 9 10
AIC 6984 6006 6164 5988
BIC 7034 6062 6220 6050
N 3618 3618 3618 3618
6-menus LL −5954 −5769 −5788 −5762 1.04
df 8 9 9 10
AIC 11924 11556 11594 11544
BIC 11974 11612 11650 11606
N 3618 3618 3618 3618
The threshold heuristic gives the best predictions for both menu lengths, while the Signal-First
heuristics comes second according to the AIC. The Naive rule is clearly rejected in all cases so con-
sumers do take CS information into account. In terms of threshold, an IS offer suffers a 4 to 5% price
penalty compared to the LPCS offer, which is a considerable amount. The consumers do not in the
aggregate appear to merely follow the dominance editing heuristic, that is, they do tend to disfavor
IS offers in favor of the LPCS.
While those aggregate results are interesting in their own right, we are more interested in individ-
ual behavior so we attempt to determine rules followed by individuals in the next section.
5.2 What rules do individuals follow?
The above techniques were used to determine rules followed by the subjects. Table 10 cross-tabulates
the number of subjects assigned to each type when looking at 3-menus and at 6-menus:
Table 10: Subjects assigned to rules, by menu length.
6 menus
Naive SF DE Th Total
3-menus
Naive 27 5 5 1 38
SF 26 19 23 3 71
DE 19 15 23 4 61
Th 9 10 9 3 31
Total 81 49 60 11 201
Pearson’s chi-square test of independence rejects the hypothesis that types are independent be-
tween 6- and 3-menus. Subjects thus tend to follow the same rules in both menu-lengths, that is,
the numbers in the diagonal of the table tend to be the highest of their respective rows and columns.
When not keeping to the same rules, those who followed the DE or the SF rule in 3-menus tend to be-
come Naive when choosing among 6-menus. The higher number of subjects being Naive when faced
with 6-menus (81 vs. 38 in 3-menus) tends to confirm that subjects do not notice the presence of a
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CS in 6-menus. Worse, the lower number of subjects following the SF rule in 6-menus vs. 3-menus
(49 vs. 71 in 3-menus) means that subjects may not even realize, after making a provisional choice
that is a CS, that it is a CS.
In terms of payoffs, and whether considering 3-menus or 6-menus, consumers following the
Naive rule tend to obtain significantly lower payoffs than consumers of all other types, as could be
expected from our analysis of rule performance in section 2.3. Consumers that follow the DE and the
SF rules obtain comparable payoffs and obtain significantly higher payoffs than Naive consumers.
Those who follow the Threshold rule also obtain significantly higher payoffs than Naive consumers
but do not obtain significantly higher payoffs than either the DE or the SF.
However, this is because some consumers, rather than favoring CS, actually disfavor them, and
are thus assigned to the Threshold rule as well. When considering only the 27 subjects of the 31
assigned to the Threshold rule that do favor CS in 3-menus, and the 6 subjects of the 11 assigned to
the Threshold rule that do favor CS in 6-menus, their payoffs are not significantly higher than the
payoffs of DE and SF subjects when considering 3-menus, but significantly higher when considering
6-menus.
Overall therefore, consumers that do not realize there is a CS do tend to obtain lower payoffs than
others, those who follow the SF, DE and Threshold rule obtain comparable payoffs in 3-menus, while
those following the Threshold rule perform significantly better in 6-menus. While theory would have
predicted that consumers following the SF rule would obtain higher payoffs than those who follow
the DE rule, the difference between their payoffs was not predicted to be large, explaining perhaps
the lack of significance of the difference in payoffs between the two.
5.3 Do consumers choose their threshold rationally?
In terms of thresholds used by those individuals that were assigned to the Threshold rule, theory
presented in this paper would predict that a rational consumer who is beset by an inability to assess
offers accurately ought to be using higher thresholds than those used by subjects that are more ac-
curate. Accuracy can be estimated by the payoffs consumers obtained when faced with menus with
no CS. Those who obtained higher average payoffs in those menus are more accurate. The following
graphs relate average payoffs obtained by subjects in menus with no CS to the threshold they used
when choosing within menus with a CS. Bigger points indicate those individuals that were actually
determined to be following the Threshold rule. We super-impose on this graph the optimal choice of
threshold for a consumer with accuracy implied by his average payoff when faced with menus with
no CS.16 The graph for 3-menus can be read as follow: Consider point (105,11), which represents a
consumer who obtained a payoff of 11 in 3 menus with no CS and used a threshold of 1.05 in 3 menus
with a CS. The curve indicates that a threshold of 1.20 would have been the optimal choice for this
consumer.
16We computed the optimal threshold to be used when the consumer knows the distribution of price variances across
menus but does not know, when presented with a menu, whether the menu has high or low price variance, as this seems
more reasonable to us. That is, with reference to part 2.2, expectation in the formula determining v∗j is taken over all menus
of a specific length.
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Figure 5: Optimal vs. realized threshold in 3 and 6-menus
We find no relation between payoffs when faced with menus with no CS and the threshold used
by the consumer, and this whether the consumer was predicted to be following the Threshold rule
or not. Furthermore, almost all points on the graph above are below the optimal line, meaning that
consumers adopted lower thresholds than optimal. Consumers who favored the CS adopted thresh-
olds of average 1.17 in 6-menus and 1.20 in 3-menus, while they would have benefited from adopting
much higher thresholds generally. While consumers that use the Threshold rule can be considered as
being more savvy than those who follow other rules, they are therefore not fully rational: they either
are not aware of their own level of accuracy, or do not make the link between their accuracy and the
threshold they ought to be using. Alternatively, consumers may have too much confidence in their
own ability to choose the best offers so they tend to use thresholds that are too low.17
5.4 Do consumers learn to follow the Threshold rule?
In this section, we want to see if consumers learn to follow the Threshold rule over the course of the
experiment. We therefore exclude the first 20 menus each consumer was faced with – since menus
were presented to each consumer in a random order, this will not be the same set of menus for each
subject – and run the same regressions as in the above parts. Assignments to types are reported in
table 11 below:
17In that respect, we note that following the DE rule can be seen as consistent if the consumer is fully confident in his
ability to assess prices accurately.
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Table 11: Subjects assigned to rules, by menu length, minus first 20 menus
6 menus
Naive SF DE Th Total
3-menus
Naive 17 8 15 3 43
SF 26 19 16 9 70
DE 13 15 22 2 52
Th 8 12 11 5 36
Total 64 54 64 19 201
Pearson’s chi-square test of independence cannot reject the hypothesis that types are indepen-
dent between 6- and 3-menus in this case. However, classification is consistent within menu lengths,
that is, 65% of individuals are classified the same way in 3-menus, and 78% in 6-menus, whether one
considers all menus or one excludes the first 20 menus. This indicates that while our classification by
type is robust within menus of the same length, this is not so across menu-length, indicating perhaps
that individuals do not follow the same rules in both cases. In terms of learning, more individuals
used the Threshold rule in later stages of the experiment, especially when considering 6-menus, but
the increase was small: only 31 disfavored the IS in 3-menus and 10 in 6-menus, vs. 27 and 6 respec-
tively when considering the whole sample. Learning in such an environment, where no menu was
ever the same, would in any case be rather difficult, since it is difficult for subjects to ascribe a high
payoff (subjects were told their payoff after each try) to the strategy they followed or to the menu
having offered a good opportunity. However, the number of subjects following a Naive selection rule
in 6-menus decreased when excluding the first 20 tries, which means subjects learned to be more
careful in looking out for a CS in 6-menus.
6 Conclusion
We found that as many as 15% of consumers favored CS offers when choosing among 3-menus, but
less than 5% did so when choosing among 6-menus, even after gaining experience with this task.
Savvy consumers (those who favored the CS) applied a large penalty to offers that were expressed
in terms of an individuated standard. For those consumers, an offer expressed in terms of an indi-
viduated standard had to be 17 to 20% less expensive than an offer expressed in terms of a common
standard before they would be as likely to choose it than if it was the best deal among CS offers. In
other terms, the best deal among common standard could be priced at $1.17 and still be as likely to
be chosen by one of our savvy consumers than if it was simply an IS offer priced at $1.00. Not only
is this the case, but this is a perfectly rational behavior when the consumer is not able to determine
the value of a product with sufficient certainty. It is then best to be very sceptical of those offers that
appear advantageous but are difficult to assess in terms that are comparable with others. However,
even those consumers who followed the Threshold rule were not sceptical enough about IS offers:
they adopted thresholds that were lower than would have been optimal given their measured inabil-
ity to make accurate choices among offers.
Even though relatively few consumers followed the Threshold rule, and those who did so adopted
lower thresholds than optimal, consumers’ aggregate behavior favored offers that were expressed in
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terms of a common standard. The large penalty applied by savvy consumers to IS offers was only par-
tially diluted into an overall penalty of 4 to 5% for IS offers when considering all consumers. This is so
even though many consumers followed other rules because the Naive rule is neutral with respect to
the existence of a common standard, the Signal-First rule merely re-allocates choice from the higher
priced CS offer to the lower priced, and the Dominance Editing rule does not penalize CS offers.
We saw that fewer consumers applied a penalty to IS offers in 6-menus than in 3-menus, and
some even applied a penalty to CS offers. This translated in the best CS offer being chosen less often
than optimal in 6-menus (see discussion of table 3). We therefore believe that our results are less
robust when applied to 6-menus than to 3-menus. It might be that “too much choice” works towards
negating the common standard effect, either because it makes it more difficult for consumers to
identify offers that are expressed in terms of a common standard, or because they are less confident
in the logic of favoring just one offer, the lower priced of the CS offers, when that means disregarding
many IS options. This means that while the Threshold rule may be effective in fighting against the
introduction of spurious complexity by those firms that wish to confuse consumers, it may not be
effective in counteracting the introduction of spurious variety, whereby firms would pursue what we
could call frame proliferation when faced with the threat of the emergence of a common standard.
For a common standard effect to be effective in markets where there is a multiplicity of choices, firms
ought therefore to be able to advertise their use of a common standard. This is where complications
occur since the claim to be following a “common standard” may be difficult to verify and there are
myriads of ways in which a standard can be debased. For example, if the common standard is in
terms of the dimension of the product’s packaging, then firms might decide not to fill it properly. If
it is in terms of weight, and in the case of food, then managers may lower the quality of the product
and mask this by adding more spices. There is therefore a role for regulatory authorities that promote
and monitor the use of standards and mandate the disclosure of the information that enters into the
definition of that standard.
We would like to examine in future work whether the extent of consumers’ preference for CS that
was uncovered in this paper is enough to drive a process of convergence towards the adoption of
common standards by firms in a competitive market. Our data is encouraging in that respect (Table
12). The lower priced of the CS offers in our menus generated significantly higher revenue than
offers expressed in terms of an individuated standard because lower priced CS offers were chosen
more often by consumers. Indeed, revenue from a LPCS offer was 0.27 on average when there were
three options, much more than revenue of 0.18 for IS offers, and 0.12 on average when there were
six options and one CS, much more again than revenue of 0.09 for IS offers. Those differences were
significant in a statistical sense as well.
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Table 12: Revenue by menu length and presence of a CS
LPCS HPCS IS LPSCS HPSCS MPLCS
3-menu
No CS 0.1643
One CS 0.2725 0.0298 0.1786
6-menu
No CS 0.0816
One CS 0.1190 0.0176 0.0860
Two CS 0.1891 0.0121 0.0875 0.1570 0.0154 0.0212
Note: See table 3 for the meaning of the headers in the case of 6-menus with two CS.
Since LPCS offers generated significantly higher revenues than others, a firm would prefer to
adopt a CS in our setting. Furthermore, consumers who favored CS offers gained higher payoffs than
others. While this may not necessarily translate into a process of convergence to a CS as hypothesized
in Gaudeul and Sugden (2011), the conditions are in place for this to be so.
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